This paper analyzes the relationship between a woman's intrahousehold bargaining position and her welfare within marriage using household data from rural China. Simultaneity problems are overcome by using dowry to proxy for bargaining position. Omitted variable bias is addressed by using grain shocks in the year preceding marriage as an instrument for dowry. Instrumented dowry positively impacts numerous measures of a wife's welfare, including household purchases, the time allocation of household members, and the woman's satisfaction with life, offering strong evidence in support of collective models of the household.
I. Introduction
The predominant model of household behavior formalized by Becker (1991) assumes that families maximize a single utility function. That is, either all household members have identical preferences or one household member functions as a dictator, determining all allocations within the household. While this ''unitary model'' has provided important insights into household behavior, it offers little perspective on how individual preferences inform these allocations. More general models of the household that explicitly account for differences in preferences have resulted. One prominent set of models treats household decisions as the result of household members engaging in cooperative Nash bargaining (Manser and Brown 1980; McElroy and Horney 1981) . 1 In such ''collective'' approaches to household behavior, the bargaining position of household members plays an important role in determining resource allocations within the household.
While the concept of intrahousehold bargaining is theoretically straightforward, measuring bargaining position is difficult in practice: There is a paucity of socioeconomic data that include both plausible measures of household bargaining and individual welfare measures, and it has proven difficult to convincingly correct for endogeneity problems with existing data (Behrman 1997) . Nevertheless, several analyses have found evidence supporting the collective models of households in many developing countries.
Due perhaps to intuitive appeal and empirical tractability, many studies focus on assignable income as a relative measure of intrahousehold bargaining position (see, for example, Folbre 1984; von Braun 1988; Garcia 1990; Hoddinott and Haddad 1995b) . They reject the income pooling hypothesis central to the unitary model and find considerable evidence that control of resources has strong implications for how those resources are used by the household. However, by using income as a regressor, they unrealistically assume that labor supply decisions are exogenous (Hoddinott and Haddad 1995a) . To avoid this simultaneity problem, other studies rely on nonlabor income to measure relative bargaining power (Schultz 1990; Thomas 1990 ). This strategy also is problematic, however, because nonlabor income may depend on individuals being in a particular state (such as receiving benefits due to temporary illness) and/or because persistent unobservable differences in productivity and taste may have influenced past asset accumulation (Behrman 1997) . Furthermore, nonlabor income may reflect previous labor supply decisions and may thus be endogenous across the life span (Strauss and Thomas 1995; Hoddinott, Alderman and Haddad 1997; Schultz 2001) . Other measures of bargaining power have included current assets (Doss 1999 ) and inherited assets (Quisumbing 1994) . However, accumulation of assets during marriage is likely to be determined simultaneously with household allocations and inherited assets may reflect unobserved characteristics of the wife. Appealing alternative indicators of bargaining position are therefore the sex ratio at the relevant marriage ages, laws governing divorce, and other environmental factors that may shift threat points within marriage (Rao and Greene 1991; Lundberg, Pollak, and Wales 1997; Ward-Batts 2001; Chiappori, Fotin, and Lacroix 2002; Anderson 2003) . In principle, variation in such parameters can be used to identify how changing threat points affect household allocations. However, in the absence of randomized experiments, these factors also may be endogenous (Hoddinott, Alderman, and Haddad 1997) . 2 In the search for exogenous determinants of intrahousehold bargaining position, one interesting recent approach has stressed the importance of assets controlled by individuals at the time of household formation. If such assets remain under the control of the original holder, they may affect relative bargaining position in the household and thus marital allocations without the simultaneity concerns that arise in the previously described studies. Hence, Thomas, Contreras, and Frankenberg (1997) find evidence that assets brought to the marriage by the wife raise children's health stocks in Indonesia, while Quisumbing and Maluccio (2003) show that such assets increase children's educational expenditures in both South Africa and Bangladesh.
3 Although concerns about simultaneity diminish when using premarital assets as a proxy for bargaining position, the possibility of omitted variable bias remains. Thus, Zhang and Chan (1999) implement a two-stage estimation strategy in which parental education is used as an instrument for dowry when estimating the effect of premarital endowments on the probability that husbands do household chores in Taiwan. In virilocal, monogamous societies such as Taiwan, dowry serves as an efficient premortem inheritance because married daughters leave the natal home while married sons do not (Botticini and Siow 2003) . However, intelligence and other unobservable characteristics of the wife may be correlated with both parental education and household bargaining outcomes, and dowry may thus not be exogenous in the second stage. Further, Zhang, and Chan (1999) do not control for cohort differences, resulting in biased estimates if younger husbands both have more educated parents and contribute more time to housework. Their identification strategy is thus subject to endogeneity problems similar to those in many previous studies of household behavior.
This paper makes use of a detailed household survey from rural China to investigate the effect of dowry on household allocation. To control for the potential endogeneity of marital payments, I use shocks to grain yield in the year preceding marriage. The surveyed households are located in rural areas where livelihoods have long depended on farming, so unanticipated shocks to grain yield in the period just before marriage are likely to have a substantial impact on household wealth accumulation, and thus on the ability of households to make transfers associated with marriage. The instrument influences payments made before marriage while remaining plausibly exogenous to household allocation decisions after marriage. In contrast to many previous studies, I also include household demographics and family background measures to better control for unobservable characteristics of the couple that may correlate with marital payments. In addition, estimates include time dummies to account for the possibilities that the amount of marital payments reflect generational norms and that factors affecting intrahousehold decisions may vary by cohort. Finally, village fixed effects control for unobserved heterogeneity at the local level. This identification strategy represents a significant improvement over previous studies in controlling effectively for potential bias from omitted variables and simultaneity. I analyze the effect of dowry on a variety of household allocation decisions of interest to the wife, including household spending on women's goods, the time that husbands allocate to chores, the time that wives allocate to leisure, and women's self-reported satisfaction with life. Because dowry is likely to influence household wealth as well as relative bargaining position, estimates control for wealth wherever possible. I find that dowry has a positive and robust effect on each of these outcomes, offering compelling evidence that premarital endowments affect household bargaining, and thus household consumption choices. These empirical results provide strong grounds for rejecting the unitary model of the household.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section II describes dowry payments and marriage markets in rural China; Section III introduces the data; Section IV details the empirical specification and identification strategy; Section V presents empirical evidence that dowry positively impacts a wife's bargaining position; and Section VI concludes.
II. Marital Transactions in Rural China
Multiple transfers between the natal families characterize the marriage ritual in China. Brideprice (pinli) is a transfer or series of transfers from the groom's parents to the bride's parents, while dowry (jiazhuang) represents a subsequent transfer from the bride's family to the bride. Thatcher (1991) dates this system to the Spring and Autumn Period of the Eastern Zhou dynasty (770-256 B.C.), and it persisted largely unchanged through the first half of the twentieth century. However, the Chinese government sought to combat ''feudal'' practices in marriage with the founding of the People's Republic of China. Central to this objective was enacting the 1950 Marriage Law that specifically prohibited ''the exaction of money or gifts in connection with marriage'' (Meijer 1971 ). Yet as Parish and Whyte (1978) describe, ''Poor peasants were less enthusiastic about marriage struggle than they were about class struggle,'' and the new rules were largely ignored (Ocko 1991; Min and Eades 1995) , particularly in rural areas.
In rural China, brideprice is negotiated between the two natal families, typically using a matchmaker as intermediary. 4 Because the bride formally leaves her own family at marriage to join her husband's family (Wolf and Huang 1980) , the negotiation focuses on how the bride's family should be compensated for investments made in rearing the bride (Croll 1981) and the loss of rights over her (Goody 1973) . A further consideration, particularly after agricultural decollectivization, is the loss of a bride's future productivity (Parish and Whyte 1978; Min and Eades 1995; Zhang 2000) . Local conditions also influence brideprice, with higher brideprice often occurring in northern China, in poor areas, and in locations with higher sex ratios. That is, brideprice is a mechanism for clearing the market, 5 but not for making bequests to the husband or to the conjugal unit directly. A marriage date also is fixed at the time 4. Marriages that are arranged by the bride and groom themselves are increasingly common. Interestingly, dowry is paid even in the majority of these marriages (Parish and Whyte 1978) . 5. It may be surprising that brideprice serves as the market-learing mechanism because population growth and sex differences in age of marriage imply that the number of women exceeds the number of men in each marriage cohort; Rao (1993) investigates a similar phenomenon in India. Possible explanations are that the benefits of marriage accrue disproportionately to husbands, that divorced men remarry while divorced women do not, or that there is greater male vis-à-vis female heterogeneity (Edlund 1996) . This puzzle remains an issue for further investigation in China. of betrothal, with engagement typically lasting one year (Liu 2000) . Brideprice is usually paid in several installments over the course of the engagement. 6 After brideprice had been paid, the bride's family determines the size and composition of the dowry; unlike brideprice, dowry is not negotiated with the groom's parents. In much of rural China, a bride's parents retain part of the brideprice and transfer part in the dowry. Offering elaborate dowries provides a vehicle for prestige building by the bride's family (Potter and Potter 1990; Siu 1993; Liu 2000) and ensures against a daughter's maltreatment by her in-laws (Wolf and Huang 1980). 7 Dowry also serves as an efficient premortem inheritance for girls that separate from their natal families (Parish and Whyte 1978; Croll 1981; Botticini and Siow 2003) . 8 Modern dowries often include bedding, clothing, furniture, and possibly other durables such as a bicycle, a sewing machine, a radio, and a television. Dowries also include a significant cash component for the bride's exclusive use.
9 Dowry thus forms the foundation of the conjugal unit's household.
Unlike the South Asian context wherein the groom's family often assumes control of dowry, the bride has ultimate authority over her dowry in China, even in extendedfamily settings (Zhang 2000; Sargeson 2003) . Indeed, Chen (1985) observes that rights to their own dowries rendered women the only private property holders during the Mao era. Similarly, McCreery (1976) and Ocko (1991) describe the purely private nature of dowry, particularly the cash component. Finally, although the eldest resident male is generally responsible for financial decisions, even he cannot appropriate the bride's dowry funds. For example, Watson (1991) and Yan (1996) describe brides using their dowries to make high-interest loans to coresident fathers-in-law who must raise brideprice for the marriage of a younger son. See also Yan (2005) .
Many intrahousehold bargaining models depend on the availability of an alternative state such as divorce (see, for example, Manser and Brown 1980) . Prior to the early 1980s, divorce was difficult to obtain in China. The 1981 Marriage Law considerably eased the requirements for divorce, however, and divorce rates have risen steadily since. In 1998, there were 0.954 divorces per 1,000 population (Wang 2001) , with the highest rates occurring in interior provinces (Zeng and Wu 2000) . Furthermore, the 1981 Marriage Law stipulates that dowry reverts to the bride in the event of marital dissolution (Ocko 1991) . Divorce is therefore a realistic option for wives in the surveyed areas.
6. An alternative practice sometimes observed is the ''exchange marriage'' in which a sister of the groom marries a brother of the bride in lieu of formal brideprice. Such marriages tend to have lower dowries (Selden 1993) . 7. Wolf and Huang (1980) write, ''Why would a poor farmer sacrifice so much to impress his son-in-law's family? Why not keep the brideprice and regard it as compensation for the resources invested in raising the girl? When we discussed these questions with our informants, they told us that a woman's family must send something so the bride is respected and treated well in her new home.'' They conclude that dowry is one manifestation of a family's general responsibility to ensure that their daughter is not treated poorly. Marriage markets in China thus differ from those in Ethiopia and elsewhere, where large dowries are primarily used to attract wealthy grooms (Fafchamps and Quisumbing 2005) . 8. The difference in timing of inheritance for sons and daughters may be attributed to higher transaction costs for daughters who have married and left the household, particularly because sons generally inherit housing, durables, and land rights because they remain in the natal village. 9. Siu (1993) and Liu (2000) describe the specific composition of individual dowries.
III. Data And Variables
The second wave of the China Rural Poverty Survey, a collaborative effort of researchers from China and the United States (including the author), was conducted in February 2001. The survey covered four officially designated poor counties, with one county in each of four interior provinces: Sichuan, Guizhou, Shaanxi, and Gansu. The survey encompassed 587 households evenly distributed across 40 villages. Excluding households in which the head is widowed, divorced, single, or absent reduces the sample to 460. I restrict the sample further by dropping five households that have key variables missing and four households in which marriage preceded the 1950 Marriage Law. The final sample thus consists of 451 couples married between 1950 and 2000, inclusive.
Respondents were asked detailed information about their marriages, including the values of dowry and brideprice.
10 Detailed demographic and time allocation data were collected for all members of the household. Additionally, household expenditures on a range of goods were collected. Last, a separate instrument designed to assess attitudes, preferences, and marital roles was asked of husbands and wives separately.
In this study, a wife's welfare is measured via household spending on women's goods, the husband's time allocated to household chores, the wife's time allocated to leisure, and the wife's self-reported satisfaction with life. Spending on women's goods is defined as the share of household income spent on salon visits and on makeup, jewelry, and other personal items.
11 Husbands' time allocated to chores is defined as the hours spent cooking, cleaning, and gathering firewood in a typical week. Leisure time is defined as the time spent outside of market work, farm work, and household chores; unfortunately, this measure may include other household activities such as time spent rearing children, sleeping, or not working because of illness, and as such, it should be interpreted to represent potential leisure time (see Schultz 2001) . To distinguish between wealth and bargaining effects stemming from dowry, husband's time allocated to chores and wife's time allocated to leisure are measured as the shares of the couple's total time allocated to chores and leisure, respectively; if wealth effects are genderneutral (admittedly, a strong assumption), then they cannot explain changes in the share of leisure time accruing to just one of the partners.
12 Self-reported satisfaction with life is measured by the extent to which the wife agrees with the statement: ''Overall, 10. Few respondents had difficulty recalling the exact amounts of their brideprice and dowry-or that of their siblings, children, or neighbors. Indeed, many respondents showed interviewers the original brideprice lists that were negotiated between the two families. All values were converted to real values using 1985 as the base year. For marriages occurring prior to 1985, prices were converted using the general retail price index, which was first calculated in 1950. For marriages occurring after the mid-1980s, prices were converted using the rural consumer price index, a more accurate rural price index that was introduced in 1985. 11. It is of course possible that men are the primary consumers of such goods, but the results detailed below are difficult to explain if this is the case. In addition, similar (but slightly weaker) results are obtained when using the share of expenditures spent on children's clothing as the outcome variable of interest. This result is consistent with higher female bargaining power resulting in improved conditions for children, a common finding in the literature (Lundberg, Pollack, and Wales 1997) . 12. However, if wealth is not gender-neutral, then wealth effects and bargaining effects are indistinguishable when looking at the shares of leisure accruing to each spouse. It is also possible that wife's leisure is a luxury good desired by both spouses. If so, then the wealth effect and bargaining effect may again be indistinguishable.
I am satisfied with my life.'' It is reported as a categorical variable with values 1 (''completely unsatisfied''), 2 (''somewhat unsatisfied''), 3 (''somewhat satisfied''), and 4 (''completely satisfied''). As only 13 women reported being either ''completely unsatisfied'' or ''completely satisfied,'' I classify responses as being either ''satisfied'' or ''unsatisfied.'' Importantly, enumerators asked female survey respondents when their husbands were not present.
Basic indicators for the 451 sample households are presented in Table 1 . Spending on women's goods accounts for 0.64 percent of annual household spending on average, but this figure varies widely: Some households spend nothing on women's goods while 24.5 percent of households allocate at least 1 percent of total expenditures to women's goods, and 5.5 percent of households allocate at least 2 percent of expenditures to such consumption. Husbands are responsible for 17.7 percent of the total time that couples devote to household chores, but 8.6 percent of husbands perform at least half of these chores. The distribution of leisure between husband and wife is somewhat skewed in the mean household, with women spending 8.3 percent less time in leisure than their husbands.
13 Finally, 61.7 percent of women report feeling satisfied with their lives.
Turning to the independent variables, the mean real dowry for all four provinces was 247 RMB (in 1985 RMB). The mean real brideprice was 538 RMB, suggesting that the bride's family retains 54 percent of the brideprice received on average. Practice varies widely by province, however: in Gansu, dowry averages just 22 percent of brideprice, while dowry exceeds brideprice by 18 percent on average in Sichuan. Further, dowry and brideprice have been appreciating at 3.8 percent and 4.6 in real terms, respectively, since 1950. The average couple has been married for 19.5 years. The typical husband is 43 years old, 2.7 years older than his wife, and has completed primary schooling, three grades more than his wife. Households include 1.4 children and 0.6 other adults on average, with boys and adult women appearing in slightly higher numbers. The total education of the married couple's parents averages 2.4 years, and husbands and wives have 3.7 and 3.8 siblings in their natal families, respectively.
14 Using 1985 as the base year, the real average household wealth as measured by the value of major durables was 651.3 RMB.
IV. Empirical Specification and Identification
Following McElroy and Horney (1981) , suppose that two individuals engage in a cooperative Nash bargaining process to maximize the joint gains from marriage. Further suppose that an endowment is assignable and exclusive to one individual and that it reverts to him or her in the event of divorce. This endowment shifts the threat point within marriage (Manser and Brown 1980) and may therefore impact the allocation of goods and leisure within marriage through a bargaining effect. At the same time, the endowment may shift the household's budget constraint, 13. Again, this measure excludes child-rearing. The wife's share of leisure time may be misleading if wives spend more time caring for children than their husbands. 14. Average family size in these areas fell considerably after the One Child Policy was adopted formally in 1979. thus increasing the holder's consumption of goods and leisure through a wealth effect. Dowry is such an endowment in rural China. Holding the total budget constant, an increase in dowry (and thus the relative bargaining position of wives) must lower the bargaining position of husbands. That is, the net effect of a change in dowry has an ambiguous impact on the husband's consumption because the wealth and bargaining effects associated with dowry offset each other, assuming that each individual's consumption is a normal household good. However, the wealth and bargaining effects are both positive for the wife. 15 As such, it is important to distinguish between bargaining and wealth effects before concluding that dowry shifts bargaining positions within marriage.
In household h in village v, the wife's share of marital resources, X w , resulting from the cooperative Nash bargaining process may be written as follows:
where D is the dowry she received at marriage, W is the household's wealth, A is the age difference between the husband and wife, E is the difference in their education levels, H is vector describing the age and sex composition of the household, F is a vector of natal family characteristics, and l cm is a county-marriage cohort interaction term. Household wealth (defined as the value of household durables) may influence consumption choices. Age differences (defined as the husband's age less the wife's) and education differences (defined analogously) may affect marital threat points by influencing options outside marriage. Household demographics may affect the distribution of household chores and the opportunity to engage in work outside the home. Characteristics of the natal households are included to control for unobserved characteristics of the bride and groom that might correlate with marital payments. Marriage cohort dummies are included to control for generational differences in marital norms; these dummies reflect periods of a decade or longer and were chosen to capture observed variation over time in both marital payments and household allocations; as such, they vary by location. In addition, a set of village dummies is included to control for sex ratios, unemployment rates, and unobserved heterogeneity at the local level.
16 If dowry affects the wife's consumption of goods or leisure, b 1 will be positive.
Dowry is unlikely to be exogenous in Equation 1 because any unobserved characteristic of the wife that affects these payments also may affect her share of marital output. For example, Boulier and Rosenzweig (1984) show that physical attractiveness affects marital allocations, and it also is plausible that it may affect the size of the dowry. Alternatively, more assertive women may receive higher dowries and be treated better than less assertive women. Similarly, a bride with a pleasant personality may receive a higher transfer from her parents and also may be treated better within marriage. By contrast, higher dowries also may result from 15. See Brown (2003) for a formal derivation. 16. Ideally, dummies for the bride's and groom's home villages would both be used, but the former are not available in this survey. Still, marriages typically occur between households in neighboring villages or towns, and only rarely across long distances. Therefore, conditions in the two natal villages are likely to be similar. unobservable negative characteristics of the groom and/or his family. That is, the bride's family may attempt to insure against poor treatment of their daughter in her conjugal home by influencing her intrahousehold bargaining position via a larger dowry. In either case, estimating Equation 1 using ordinary least squares (OLS) will produce biased and inconsistent estimates, warranting an instrumental variables approach.
With incomplete credit markets in China's rural areas (Jalan and Ravallion 1999) , household savings are the primary source of marital payments. As a result, the instrumental variable employed in this study reflects savings available at the time of marriage. Specifically, the deviation from trend in provincial per capita grain yield in the year immediately preceding marriage is used to instrument for dowry. Grain yield is a particularly important determinant of income and saving in the survey areas because virtually all households are engaged in grain production. The deviations from trend are the residuals from regressing historical per capita grain yield data in each province on a linear spline of harvest year; this identification strategy isolates the effect of transitory output shocks that are independent of time trends in agricultural production in each locality.
17 Because marriage almost always occurs in the year following betrothal negotiations (Liu 2000) , grain shocks are lagged one year.
18
One concern with this estimation strategy arises if certain families seek to postpone marriage until after a good harvest. For example, parents may choose between selling assets and negotiating marriage for daughters to smooth consumption after bad harvests; if parents who choose the former strategy have different preferences or give different dowries than parents who choose the latter, then the timing of marriage may be endogenously determined. However, the willingness to postpone betrothal or marriage for an uncertain outcome may be tempered by strong cultural preferences for children marrying before certain ages, as suggested by Coale (1984) and Gu and Yang (1991) . Indeed, the correlation between grain shocks and the bride's age is -0.24, underscoring the idea that parents are unlikely to postpone betrothal for reasons related to agricultural output. Furthermore, other observable characteristics of the couple and their families are not correlated with grain shocks at the time of betrothal. For example, the correlation between grain shocks and the bride's (groom's) education level is 0.16 (0.09) and the correlation between grain shocks and the bride's (groom's) parents' education level is 0.00 (0.01). The correlation between grain shocks and the number of siblings of each marital partner is similarly negligible. In addition, the number of betrothals in years with good 17. I tried other variables as instruments as well, including parent occupational status, historical data on land affected by natural disaster, and historical local grain yield data. However, none of these measures explains as much variation in dowry as regional grain yield shocks. There is low variation in parent occupation, with only 1.7 percent of households lacking a farmer. Historical natural disaster data has strong predictive power, but is unavailable for the Cultural Revolution period. Local grain yield is unavailable for several years, and this variable has surprisingly little predictive power even when it is available. A related issue is that wealthier households may be able to smooth consumption and thus be better insulated against income shocks. In this sample, however, interacting the instruments with parent characteristics such as education and occupation provides no additional explanatory power. 18. Because the groom's family is expected to give elaborate and expensive gifts to the bride's family during the length of the engagement (Yan 1996) and because the bride will contribute to the groom's family's income, the engagement period is typically fixed at one year. Given the high opportunity cost of delay for the groom's family, postponements are very uncommon.
harvests is statistically indistinguishable from the number in years with bad harvests, further suggesting that parents do not time their daughter's engagements. To further test the validity of the instrument, I regressed dowry on deviations from trend in grain yield for the marriage year, the betrothal year (that is, the year preceding marriage), and for each of the three years following marriage. The estimated effect of grain shocks in the betrothal year has a positive and significant effect (at the 99 percent confidence level) while grain shocks that occur after marriage have no effect.
Several more general concerns with the empirical strategy also merit discussion. First, wealth may be simultaneously determined with household allocation. However, the only appropriate instrument available is the family's holding of highquality flat land, the preferred land for agricultural production. This instrument is plausibly exogenous from household decisions about the wife's consumption of goods; it is not exogenous to time, however, because a household's land holding is correlated with the time used to farm it. Wealth is therefore excluded from the empirical specifications that estimate the determinants of time allocation. Notably, however, including uninstrumented wealth as an additional regressor does not affect the point estimates for dowry. Second, it is a priori unclear whether the effect of dowry persists long into marriage. On the one hand, the cash component of dowry may have been spent and the value of durables may depreciate over time, suggesting that dowry becomes less important. On the other hand, the dowry may have been used to make interest-bearing loans as observed by Watson (1991) and Yan (1996) , increasing the assets under the wife's control and hence her bargaining position. In addition, norms established early in the marriage may persist, so any effect of dowry on household allocations may endure. Indeed, the estimated effect of dowry on time allocation is not significantly different for couples married for more than 10 years versus those married fewer than 10 years, suggesting that the effects of dowry persist. Third, it also is possible that dowry correlates with a woman's social status, and that status is the true determinant of her intrahousehold bargaining position. To address this particular concern, I included measures of the bride's social status (for example, whether the husband's or wife's relations assist the household in times of need and which spouse's families are visited during important holidays) as additional regressors in Equation 1; I find that they have no discernible impact on the point estimates for dowry. Table 2 presents estimates of the effect of dowry on the household's spending on women's goods as a share of total household expenditure. Women's goods include spending on makeup, jewelry, and personal services such as salon visits. Dowry is measured as the square root of the real value of the payment (in hundreds of 1985 RMB) to account for nonlinearities and possible skewness in the estimates. 19 Estimates control for age and education differences, household
V. Empirical Results
19. Logs are an appealing alternative to address the problems of nonlinearities and skewness in dowry given the ease of interpretation, but dowry was not paid in several marriages. To protect these observations from dropping out of the analysis, square roots are used instead.
demographics, parental education, and sibling effects. County of residence and marriage cohort dummies and interactions are also included to control for time and location trends in marriage payments and marital outcomes, and village fixed effects are incorporated to account for unobserved heterogeneity at the local level. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are used to calculate the t and z statistics reported in the tables. Column 1 shows OLS estimates. The effect of dowry is statistically zero, suggesting that assignable marital payments do not have a strong impact on consumption patterns within the household. As noted above, however, dowry may reflect unobserved characteristics of the bride, the groom, and their families, and hence this Notes: Point estimates are multiplied by 100. Robust t or z statistics in parentheses * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent.
estimate may be inconsistent. For example, a pleasant personality, confidence and assertiveness, and physical attractiveness may affect both the size of a bride's dowry and allocations within marriage. These unobserved positive characteristics of the bride will bias the estimated coefficients on dowry upward. On the other hand, a bullying nature and other unobservable negative characteristics of the groom may prompt parents concerned about their daughter's welfare to increase the size of dowry as a means of ensuring better treatment for her. In these cases, the estimated coefficients on dowry are biased downward. 20 Because the direction of the bias caused by omitted variables is ambiguous, the true effect of dowry is unclear.
21
Using exogenous shocks to grain output to instrument for dowry (Column 2), the estimated effect of dowry is positive: a one-unit change in the square of instrumented dowry increases spending on women's goods by 0.0063 percentage points. This result suggests that dowry correlates with unobserved negative characteristics of the groom per the above discussion. An alternative explanation is that dowry is measured with considerable error. However, given the cultural significance of this transfer and the fact that survey respondents rarely had difficulty recalling exact values for marital transactions, I find this explanation unlikely. In any event, the effect of instrumented dowry on household consumption of women's goods is statistically significant, indicating that dowry does influence spending within marriage. First-stage estimates are presented in Table 3 . Deviations from trend in grain output have a strong influence on dowry, with an F-statistic of 15.84, indicating that the size distortion is well below 10 percent for a 5 percent level test (Stock and Yogo 2005) , comfortably rejecting the possibility of weak identification.
The positive and significant effect of instrumented dowry on consumption of women's goods persists when controlling for household wealth (Table 2 , Column 3) as proxied by the value of household durables; as with dowry, wealth is measured as the square root of the real value (in hundreds of 1985 RMB). Because wealth may be simultaneously determined with consumption decisions, the household's allocation of high-quality flat land is used as an instrument. The estimated effect of instrumented wealth on consumption of women's goods in not significantly different from zero, but controlling for wealth is nevertheless important given that dowry potentially produces a wealth effect. 22 Again, the first stage is presented in Table 3 . The F-statistic for the influence of flat land on wealth is 6.30, indicating that the size distortion is approximately 20 percent for a 5 percent level test (Stock and Yogo 2005) . Although this instrument is weaker than that for dowry, it remains sufficiently strong that it is not considered a ''weak instrument'' (Murray 2006) . Moreover, the Stock and Yogo (2005) test for weak identification with multiple endogenous regressors is rejected with a Cragg-Donaldson F-statistic of 5.23. Finally, to account for the possibility that brideprice also influences household consumption choices, brideprice is included as an additional regressor (Table 2, 20. Negative aspects of the bride also may prompt a larger dowry, but this is unlikely in the Chinese context because dowry is assignable and exclusive to the bride. 21. The Davidson and MacKinnon (1993) test rejects the exogeneity of dowry at the 99 percent confidence level. OLS is thus an inconsistent estimator. 22. Whether or not instrumental variables are used for wealth has no statistical bearing on the estimated effect of dowry. 23. Thus, the size distortion for both instruments is below 10 percent for a 5 percent level test.
Column 4). As with dowry and wealth, brideprice is measured as the square root of the real value (in hundreds of 1985 RMB). The point estimate is not significantly different from zero. This finding supports the conclusions of Zhang and Chan (1999) , who argue that brideprice primarily serves as a market clearing mechanism between the couple's parents and, as such, will not directly affect outcomes within their marriage. Moreover, the estimated effect of instrumented dowry remains positive and Notes: Robust t statistics in parentheses * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent.
significant when controlling for brideprice, suggesting that the impact of dowry is quite robust.
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The finding that a woman's bargaining position influences the households' consumption of female goods is consistent with the conclusions of Lundberg, Pollak, and Wales (1997) , who show that higher female bargaining power is associated with additional spending on women's clothing in the United Kingdom. Similarly, Quisumbing and Maluccio (2003) show that a wife's assets at marriage positively influence spending on children's education within marriage in Bangladesh and South Africa. Other studies have relied on nonassignable expenditure categories to reach similar conclusions. For example, Hoddinott and Haddad (1995b) , Rubalcava and Thomas (2002) , Schmeer (2005) , and Doss (2006) find that higher women's bargaining power leads to a higher share of income being allocated to food consumption in Côte d'Ivoire, the United States, the Philippines, and Ghana, respectively. Maitra (2004) finds that health care utilization improves when women control household resources in India. Spending on children's education, food, and health is often associated with female preferences (Deaton 1997; Brown and Park 2002) , although men's bargaining power has also been shown to influence such spending in some areas (Quisumbing and Maluccio 2003) .
The number of children in the household negatively influences spending on female goods, although the effect is only significant for girls. This result is not surprising given that rural Chinese children rarely visit salons or consume makeup, jewelry, and other women's goods. On the other hand, the number of adult women in the household positively influences consumption of women's goods, as expected. Age and education differences are also weakly associated with higher spending on women's goods. The fact that characteristics of the natal families do not appear to affect consumption of women's goods may be an artifact of including the large number of controls reflected in marriage cohorts, county dummies, their interactions, and village fixed effects in the regressions. Table 4 presents estimates for the determinants of the husband's time allocated to chores, the wife's time allocated to leisure, and the wife's self-reported satisfaction with life. All three are estimated using linear two-stage least squares. 25 Instrumented dowry is included in all three regressions, but because brideprice does not affect marital outcomes either empirically (Table 1) or theoretically (Zhang and Chan 1999) , brideprice is not included. The only available instrument for wealth is the household's allocation of high-quality, flat land; land allocation is correlated with the time required to farm it, and wealth is thus excluded from the regressions in which time is the outcome of interest. To account for the fact that dowry may nevertheless have a wealth effect in addition to a bargaining effect, husband's time allocated to chores and wife's time allocated to leisure are measured as the shares of the couple's total time allocated to chores and leisure, respectively. Thus, if the wealth effect
24. An early version of this paper uses sibling sex composition to instrument for brideprice (Brown 2003) . However, instrumented brideprice does not significantly affect marital outcomes, and it has been dropped from the analysis. 25. The linear probability model is perhaps less desirable than an IV probit for the binary self-reported satisfaction measure, but IV estimates did not converge in the maximum likelihood procedure. Given the smaller sample size for this outcome and the large number of explanatory variables, nonconvergence is not unexpected. associated with dowry is gender-neutral, then the estimates for dowry reflect bargaining only.
26
Instrumented dowry has a statistically and economically significant effect on all three outcomes. For example, a one-unit change in the square of instrumented dowry increases the share of household chores performed by husbands and the share of the couple's leisure time accruing to women by 0.23 and 0.021 percentage points, respectively. The finding for husband's chores is robust both to time spent on other Notes: Point estimates are multiplied by ten for wife's leisure time. Robust z statistics in parentheses * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent.
26. As noted above, I also estimated each of these specifications with uninstrumented wealth as an additional regressor. Doing so has no bearing on the estimated impact of dowry.
household chores and to controlling for the health status of wives. 27 These results support the observations of Zhang and Chan (1999) , who show that dowry significantly reduces the probability that a husband does ''none'' or ''some'' household chores while increasing the probability that the husband is ''very much involved'' with household management in Taiwan. The finding that exogenous increases in bargaining position raise women's leisure time is also consistent with previous studies. For example, Rubalcava and Thomas (2002) and Rangel (2006) show that improvements in government support offered to single mothers increase women's nonwork time within marriage by changing their opportunity set outside of marriage in the United States and Brazil, respectively. Similarly, a one-unit change in the square of instrumented dowry increases wife's satisfaction by 0.86 percentage points. This effect is independent of wealth, suggesting that bargaining position does indeed influence this very direct measure of well-being within marriage.
Other results from Table 4 show that larger age gaps are associated with the husband doing a greater share of the household chores. Not surprisingly, the influence of age differences is strongest when men have reached retirement age and women have not. Age differences are also associated with increased self-reported satisfaction, perhaps because these men are doing a greater share of the household chores. The number of adult men in the household significantly reduces the share of chores undertaken by the husband, although it does not impact a wife's satisfaction or leisure time. Other regressors do not have a statistically significant effect on these marital outcomes; as noted above, however, the influence of these factors is likely captured by marriage cohort, county dummies, and village fixed effects.
For the sake of robustness, I reestimate each model using dowry as a share of brideprice (Table 5 ). The share is instrumented using grain shocks and the square root is taken to account for nonlinearities and skewness in the estimates. Because brideprice is not paid in many marriages, the number of observations is considerably lower. Still, dowry comprising a higher share of brideprice is correlated with improvements in a women's welfare within marriage, consistent with the main results of this paper. However, the estimated effect is not statistically significant in any of the regressions. The large standard errors and statistical insignificance of this share measure suggest either that the dowry as a share of brideprice doesn't have sufficient variation to identify the effect of bargaining power on other household outcomes or that brideprice truly does not belong in the model. Either way, this reaffirms the approach of using dowry alone as an indicator of bargaining power.
VI. Conclusion
Theory predicts that individual control of resources affects bargaining position within marriage, and thus each spouse's allocation of marital output. While the concept of bargaining position is straightforward, measuring it for 27. Husbands may increase their share of household chores when wives are chronically sick. However, health data are available for two-thirds of these households, and in this subsample, the wife reported no sickness in the previous year in half of all households. Only one woman reported being sick for more than a month and none reported being sick for more than five weeks.
Table 5
Dowry as a Share of Brideprice Notes: Point estimates are multiplied by 100 for spending on women's goods and by ten for wife's leisure time.
Robust z statistics in parentheses * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent.
empirical investigation has proven difficult. Labor income, nonlabor income, inherited and accumulated assets, and extrahousehold environmental parameters each potentially suffer from simultaneity bias in the absence of strong identifying assumptions. An interesting alternative indicator of bargaining position is individual endowments brought to the marriage, such as dowry and other bequests. However, previous studies focusing on the impact of these transfers on welfare within marriage have not sufficiently controlled for omitted variable bias. In China, dowry is a premortem inheritance that builds prestige for the bride's natal family and that helps to prevent maltreatment of a bride by her in-laws. The bride enjoys sole control over her dowry, retaining this authority even in the event of divorce, a realistic option. Dowry thus serves as an excellent proxy for a woman's intrahousehold bargaining position. This paper therefore uses data from rural China to investigate the impact of dowry on several measures of household allocation in a cooperative Nash bargaining framework. To control for the potential endogeneity of marital payments, I use regional grain yield shocks in the year preceding marriage as an instrument: Output shocks are likely to have a large effect on savings in agricultural areas (and thus on the ability of households to pay dowry) while remaining exogenous to household allocation decisions after marriage. I also include age, education, household demographics, and characteristics of the natal families to better control for unobservables that may correlate with marital payments. Furthermore, village fixed effects control for unobserved heterogeneity. This identification strategy represents a significant improvement over previous studies in controlling effectively for potential bias from omitted variables and simultaneity.
I find that dowry has a positive and robust impact on the household's consumption of women's goods, on the husband's share of the total time allocated to household chores, and on the wife's share of the couple's time spent in leisure. Dowry has a positive and significant effect on each of these outcomes, and changes in the distribution of goods and time within the household are difficult to explain unless dowry has an effect on intrahousehold bargaining. In addition, higher dowry is associated with higher self-reported satisfaction with life. These results provide strong empirical support for the theoretical literature linking control of resources to intrahousehold allocation decisions, and thus to the collective models of household.
